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Modern enterprise networks have become targets of attacks from Internet malware including 
worms, self-propagating bots, spamming bots, client-side infects (drive-by downloads) and 
phishing attacks. The results of a cyber-attack which include loss of company information, theft 
of money, costs of repairing the affected systems and perhaps damage to the reputation of the 
organization, can be devastating. However, with the right tools, security can dissect suspicious 
traffic to detect these attacks.  
When a company institutes a good method of network security surveillance, security analysts 
could be alerted within minutes of problems occurring in good time. It is with this aim that this 
study sought to research and develop a simple and robust system that could be used to detect 
suspicious activities in network traffic. Specifically, the study sought to; Discuss and analyze 
suspicious activities in network traffic and devices; analyze the existing techniques used to detect 
suspicious activities in network traffic; develop a system for detecting suspicious activities in a 
network traffic; and validate the proposed system. The study adopted an experimental design. 
The experiment was conducted on an Ubuntu machine running 16.04 LTS where Snort was 
installed alongside PulledPork, Barnyard2 and BASE to act as the Web GUI. ICMP large packets 
were sent to the network for detection and the system was able to detect, analyze and report them 
on the BASE GUI.  
The target population for this study was network traffic. The researcher generated the network 
traffic through sending data packets across the networks. The network traffic was analysed by 
using the network security tools analysed by the researcher and chosen based on their availability 
and compatibility with one another to come with the desired setup. 
This research was not aimed at reinventing the wheel but offering major improvement through 
precise feedback on what network administrators across different organizations could identify as 
suspicious activities in their networks.  
Keywords: Snort; Basic Analysis and Security Engine(BASE), PulledPork; Barnyard2; 
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP).  
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Definition of terms 
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Kothari (2008) pose that all inbound and outbound network activity should be inspected and 
identified as suspicious when necessary when network or system activity indicates that someone 
is attempting to break in. 
Network traffic – refers to the amount of data moving across a network at a given point of time 
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Chapter 1      
Introduction 
   1.1 Background to the Study 
Due to the persistent and universal nature of the Internet’s traffic sent to unused addresses, 
modern enterprise networks have become continuous targets of attacks from a large number of 
attacks from Internet malware including worms, self-propagating bots, spamming bots, client-
side infects (drive-by downloads) and phishing attacks (Pang et al., 2005). According to Zhu, 
Yegneswaran and Chen (2009), estimates on the number of malware instances released vary 
vastly (between tens of thousands to more than hundreds of thousands per month) depending on 
census methodologies. However, there is consensus that malware is becoming increasingly 
widespread, sophisticated, and a formidable threat not just to the network communications but 
also as a purveyor of data and identity theft (Chen, Dimitriou & Zhou, 2009). 
The widespread growth of networks has created remarkable possibilities and a big challenge for 
people and organizations. The uncontrolled growth of networks has also led to an increase 
number of intruders on the internet making everyone to be at risk of attacks. Therefore, a strong 
mechanism is a necessity to protect computer systems and organizations from intrusion. Safwan 
(2016) 
Spiegel, McCorkendale and Sobel (2007) noted that a network worm automatically spreads from 
computer to computer by exploiting software vulnerability that allows an arbitrary program to be 
executed without proper authorization. For instance, Acohido and Swartz (2004) reported that 
the Sasser worm located a Personal Computer (PC) running a vulnerable operating system and 
successfully compromised the machine in less than four minutes from when the machine was 
connected to the internet. The Slammer worm, which broke into the majority of vulnerable hosts 
on the internet in less than ten minutes, congested many networks and left at least 75,000 hosts 
infected (Moore & Shannon, 2002). 
According to Mitrokotsa and Douligeris (2007), once a host has been compromised, it can be 
used for such heinous activities such as launching Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, relaying 
spam emails, and initiating the propagation of new worms. An example is the Bagle worm that 
downloads a program that turns an infected machine into a zombie that an attacker can control 
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remotely (Czosseck & Geers, 2009). As a result, a large number of exploitable machines are 
readily available to an attacker, thus facilitating distributed and large-scale automated attacks. 
Furthermore, because attackers tend to exploit a vulnerability soon after it becomes known, it is 
extremely difficult for system administrators to patch every vulnerability on their machines 
before a new malicious code is released. The speed and prevalence of automated attacks render 
ineffective any legacy defences that rely on the manual inspection of each case. It is necessary to 
deploy an automated defence system that continuously monitors network traffic, determines 
whether the traffic from a particular source reveals a certain malicious activity, and then triggers 
an alarm when it finds such traffic (Costa, 2007; Jung, 2006). Furthermore, it is more important 
if the defence system makes it easier to analyse these attacks and provide a good summary for 
security and network professionals to detect situations out of the normal operation.  
     1.1.1 Global Perspective on suspicious activities 
The global perspective of suspicious activity is not very different from the Kenyan perspective 
discussed below. A report presented before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on 
Financial Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations in June 2015 further explains 
the extent to which cyber-attacks around the world is taking shape. The report approximated that 
an attack happens every 34 seconds every day. These are mainly targeted at banks and financial 
institutions. The interesting bit is that the rate of an attack every 34 seconds is not an attack that 
banks are aware of. They are somewhat new attacks or attempts to breach the system (J. Cilluffo, 
Madon & Bejtlich, 2015).  
As J. Cilluffo, Madon and Bejtlich (2015) explain, attacks no longer target the big businesses 
that can be termed as wall street listed businesses but small and medium sized businesses. The 
report supports that a need for mitigation and detection is important. As much as companies are 
trying to create a good defence system, the advancement of technology and the ubiquitous nature 
that it comes with pushes innovation higher and at the same time, widens the spectrum and 
complexity of the nature of attacks around the world. 
The global perspective attacks include a number of actors who act on different intentions, 
motives and capabilities. Beyond this, terrorists pose a threat because they usually have the right 
intentions to launch attacks but lag behind in terms of capabilities. Criminal organizations on the 
3 
 
other hand prove to be capable but their motivation and intent is different from what drives 
terrorists. 
      1.1.2 Kenya Perspective on suspicious activities 
Cherono (2017) reported that a wave of unprecedented cyber-attacks had swept across the globe, 
with over 350 companies and hundreds of thousands of computers in 152 countries affected. The 
attack by a computer worm or ransomware called WannaCry (Wanna Decryptor) targets the 
Microsoft Windows operating system, encrypts files and demands that the user pay ransom 
before being allowed to continue using the computer.  
In Kenya, computer forensics and data recovery company East Africa Data Handlers said it had 
received 14 cases of servers that had been affected by the ransomware. Among these clients, two 
were multinationals, who had the entire 15-year data manipulated and lost. The existence of the 
malware in the country was confirmed by the country's cyber security response agency, the 
National Kenya Computer Incident Response Team Coordination Centre (KE-CIRT-CC) 
managing director, Mr. George Njoroge of the East Africa Data Handlers. He warned that many 
companies, in the country were at risk of attacks by the ransomware because many companies 
and individuals do not upgrade their security infrastructure, mostly because of the current 
economic challenges. He added that the best solution was to keep pace with the dynamic changes 
in technology (Cherono, 2017). 
According to Serianu (2016), there was a growing dependence on third parties by organizations 
in Kenya which had resulted in introduction of new attack vectors. Organizations were handing 
over a lot of the typical controls that you would expect to see internally to these third parties. 
Kenyan organizations were not adequately performing risk assessment on their service providers 
before or during their engagements. As a result, many breaches that occurred in the recent past 
involved a third party in one way or another. Further, the report pointed out that the Internet of 
Things (IoT) or Internet-connected devices were growing at an exponential rate and so were 
related threats. IoT had been adopted into various sectors of the economy including agriculture, 
healthcare, energy and transportation. Due to their insecure implementation and configuration, 
these Internet-connected embedded devices, including CCTVs and nanny cams, Smart TVs, 




  1.2 Statement of the Problem 
Most organizations use computers connected on a network to streamline their business process 
(Fuchsberger, 2005). While they connect to the internet, their Information Technology systems 
are always under the risk of attacks from intruders. Some of these attacks are sophisticated and 
hidden which result to loss of company data, theft of money, costs of repairing the affected 
systems, fines and regulatory sanctions and perhaps worst of all, reputation of the organization.  
Network security surveillance and host monitoring is one of the best ways to detect modern 
threats attacking a networked environment. With the right tools, security can dissect suspicious 
traffic and analyse suspicious activities to detect these attacks. When a company institutes a good 
method of networked environment security surveillance, security analysts can be alerted within 
minutes of problems occurring in good time. However, Kohn, Eloff and Eloff (2013) note that, 
while it is standard practice to examine logs to discover or conduct forensic analysis of 
suspicious activity in a network, such investigation remains a largely manual process and often 
relies on signatures of known threats. A major challenge is that security products often come 
from a patchwork of vendors and are inconsistently installed and administered. They produce log 
data with widely differing formats, and logs that are often incomplete, mutually contradictory, 
very large in volume (e.g., security-relevant logs in a large enterprise grow by terabytes per day), 
and filled with non-specific or invalid event records.  Besides the logs from numerous packets 
capturing software being complicated, viewing them is a problem. It requires one to be keen and 
read a lot of unnecessary information while at it.  
Many techniques have been adopted yet most organizations’ servers, websites and personal 
accounts are still being attacked. Intrusion prevention systems tend to attempt to stop an 
intrusion attempt but at the same time, it is not able to see the bad traffic that lies within a packet 
that is assumed to be good. Signature-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) can easily detect 
known attacks but are unable to detect new attacks for which there is no pattern available. 
Anomaly Detection Systems (ADS) detect unknown attacks by comparing new behaviour 
against a trustworthy activity. This approach enables the detection of previously unknown 
attacks but the risk of legitimate activity being classified as malicious is increased. This indicates 
a gap on the most effective technique to be integrated to effectively counter these challenges. In 
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order to fill this gap, this study proposed the development of an efficient, customizable intrusion 
detection system that is a mixture of signature based, behaviour based and intrusion prevention 
system to have high accuracy detection rate and reduction of false alarm rate.  
  1.3 Objectives of the Study 
 1.3.1 General Objective 
The purpose of this study was to develop a system that can be used to detect suspicious activities 
in the network traffic. 
 1.3.2 Specific Objectives 
i. To discuss suspicious activities that can be found in network traffic. 
ii. To review the existing techniques used to detect suspicious activities in network traffic. 
iii. To develop a system for detecting suspicious activities in a network traffic. 
iv. To test the system for the detection of suspicious network activities.  
  1.4 Research questions 
i. What suspicious activities can be found in network traffic? 
ii. What are the existing techniques used to detect suspicious activities in network traffic? 
iii. How can a system for detecting suspicious activities in network traffic be developed? 
iv. How can the system for detecting suspicious network activities be tested?  
  1.5 Justification for the Study 
Every organization needs to protect its assets. The assets mean the information that is stored in 
the computer networks, which is as crucial and valuable as the tangible assets of the company. 
(Courtney, 2014). This hence calls for every person and organization on the network to monitor 
their system for unauthorized access and any other attacks or suspicious activities. Some of these 
attacks are sophisticated and hidden which may result to loss of company data, theft of money 
and perhaps worst of all, reputation of the organization. 
It is therefore important to deploy an automated defense system that continuously monitors 
network traffic, determines whether the traffic from a particular source reveals a certain 
malicious activity, and then triggers an alarm when it finds such traffic (Costa, 2007; Jung, 
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2006). Besides that, the system should present an easy to use and analyze interface that presents 
the network activities to network administrators and security analysts. The network administrator 
is then able to get the data secured by taking appropriate action against the attacks. Interfacing 
between the logs and a good UI system has been a problem especially when customizing IDS.  
Tremendous growth and usage of the internet al.so raises concerns about how to protect and 
communicate the digital information in a safer manner. This prompts for a review of the systems 
and techniques used.  
  1.6 Scope of the study  
The study provided sufficient insight on detection of suspicious activities on network traffic 
based on intrusion detection: signature based and anomaly detection and intrusion prevention 
systems. The work done by Wu et al. (2008) explains that signature-based intrusion systems 
analyze information it gathers and compares it to a large database of attack signatures. The 
system looks for a specific attack that has already been documented. Snort is one of the main 
softwares used as a packet sniffer and a logger. Integrating snort with BASE provided a web 
front-end query and analyzed the alerts coming from a snort system.  Barnyard2 was one of the 
additional components, which processed the incoming packets and save them in MySQL 
database. Pulled pork downloaded automatically the latest snort rules.  
This research focused on looking to sniff out ICMP traffic from the network, this will be done by 
SNORT. The module that will implement this functionality was written by the researcher using 
custom rules. The researcher opted to only alert whenever and ICMP packet is sent on the 




Literature Review  
 
   2.1 Introduction  
This chapter exhaustively looks at the previous work in the field of Network Security. The 
chapter starts by scrutinizing suspicious activities in network traffic. Where the chapter 
categorizes them into suspicious activities within the LAN and WAN then followed by a 
thorough discussion on DDoS.  This is followed by an analysis on the existing techniques used to 
detect suspicious activities in network traffic. The chapter looks at the existing implementation 
of systems for detecting suspicious activities in network traffic that has been developed. Finally, 
the concept diagram of this research is presented.  
2.2 A discussion of suspicious activities in network traffic  
Analyzing network traffic as suggested by (NEEDHAM & Lampson, 2008) show some clear 
resemblance between the attacks that malicious users propagate now and the attacks that were 
being propagated in the early 2000s. NEEDHAM and Lampson (2014) go ahead to discuss that 
as much as these attacks leverage on the vulnerabilities of network protocols and software, 
patches and updates are being released day in day out. The same way, attackers are still finding 
similarities in these bugs that make them just improve on their attack procedures and are able to 
infiltrate networks and systems.  
This paper acknowledges that IP is the most popular networking protocol that is used by most 
devices in a networked environment. Owing to the nature of operation of the IP protocol where it 
does not provide authentication services or confidentiality, most attacks can emanate from this 
vulnerability and compromise the network or the systems in the network. These attacks can be 
launched from within the LAN or be within the WAN.  
     2.2.1 Attacks on Local Area Networks  
Individuals within an organization can propagate such attacks or suspicious activities by taking 
over an account using someone else’s credentials and committing fraud. How such activities are 
conducted involves the deployment of a packet sniffer that harvests the passwords of the root 
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accounts and use them to create other fraudulent accounts to perpetrate fraud on the information 
systems. Such activities are quite hard to detect and require some form of thorough network 
traffic and host activities analysis to notice the suspicious activities that occur in the network.  
Another sophisticated attack or suspicious activity in a LAN is hijacking ARP messages and 
giving out wrong responses to client computers hence an attacker pauses as the victim. This kind 
of attack requires the victim machine to be powered off so that they cannot be alerted when this 
theft of identity happens (Vidya et al., 2011). However, attackers are patient enough to execute 
this. In other instances, the attacker can decide to launch another attack that forcefully brings 
down the victim’s machine. This can be done by throwing the machine off the network by 
assigning subnet masks that are out of scope whenever they are joining the network after a cold 
boot or a soft boot. As for the victim’s machine, their layer 3 address makes them vanish in their 
subnet thus become invisible. This makes it possible for the attacker to pose as the victim.  
 Such sophisticated attacks on identity theft cannot be easily detected by running packet sniffer 
software or log analysis from a naïve approach. It is incumbent on security analysts to customize 
the network security tools to notice these subtle changes in their network activity and possibly 
notify them early enough as (Vidya et al., 2011) explains.  
     2.2.2 Attacks that take advantage of WAN connections 
With IPv4 lacking the authentication and confidentiality capabilities other supporting 
technologies that make communication possible like TCP suffer from compromise. The SYN 
flooding attack that study the three-way handshake procedure of the TCP and then floods an 
unsuspecting user with multiple SYN messages. Probably more than they can handle that hence 
leaves them with half-open connections and eventually make them unable to run any other 
service (Stallings et al., 2012).  
Smurf attacks are among the unusual network activities that happen in the background and end 
up utilizing a network bandwidth without the administrator noticing. Propagation of this attack 
happens when the attacker sends out numerous ICMP requests and forges the source address to 
be a victim’s computer in their target network. These ICMP echo requests can hit other Smurf 
amplifies as identified by NEEDHAM and Lampson (2008) which quotes the website 
www.netscan.org to be known to propagate Smurf amplifiers. The machines that receive this 
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ICMP echo request will respond, if they are alive to victim’s computer and swamp the target 
with more ICMP packets that it cannot cope with and eventually bring them down. Servers are 
the target for these kinds of attacks.  
Source level routing, a concept that was introduced in TCP to get around bad routers had its own 
vulnerabilities that attackers would leverage on to reroute their target computers to send packets 
to the wrong intermediary devices. Hence, they end up being manipulated. Message redirecting 
in networks is also an activity that goes on silently without the administrator noticing there is an 
attacker, effectively saying, as NEEDHAM and Lampson (2008) states, “You should have sent 
this message to the other gateway instead”. This redirection goes on in a network without 
checking and most ISPs and other supporting services like mail routing become less competent 
to not allow source routing and redirection of packets from host machines. This poses the danger 
to intercept packets and modify them or make them disappear.  
        2.2.3 The broad umbrella of DDoS attacks  
DDoS attacks are an extrapolation of Denial of Service attacks (Visbal, 2015). As much as DoS 
prevents legitimate users from using a system, DDoS will do the same thing but the method of 
deployment is what sets these attacks apart. A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is a 
coordinated attack on the availability of services of a given target system or network that is 
launched indirectly through many compromised computing systems (Specht & Lee, 2004). The 
services under attack is usually called the “primary victim”, and the compromised systems that 
attackers use to launch the attacks is called the “secondary victims.” The use of secondary 
victims in a DDoS attack places the attacker at a vantage position because the effects of their 
disruption of network operations can scale far and wide but they will always remain anonymous. 
This makes it more difficult for network forensics to track down the real attacker.  
The primary and secondary victims in a DDoS attack represent the most common model of 
launching an attack(Bhuyan et al., 2014). The agent handler model comprises of an attacker, the 
handler, the agents and the victims. The attacker communicates with the handlers who are 
widespread within the internet. The handler then identifies the agents that they can compromise 
or have been compromised already and use them to launch an attack on the victim.  
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The taxonomy of DDoS attacks is what the broad area of security dissects and coin terms to 
describe specific attacks. Some of these attacks were discovered in the early years and have since 
been improving while others are recent developments that respond to the growing transformation 
of the internet and protocols that run it.  
However, DDoS attacks can be broadly categorized into these two; bandwidth depletion attacks 
and resource depletion. From these, the sub categories of the attacks can emanate. Bandwidth 
depletion attacks can be either amplification attacks that involves zombie computers sending 
messages to a broadcast IP address causing all the devices in the subnet reached by the broadcast 
address to send a reply to the victim system (Visbal, 2015).  
The other bandwidth depletion attack method can be flood attacks. Ahn and Jang (2012) 
supported by Specht & Lee (2004) explain and describe flood attacks as zombies sending large 
volumes of traffic to a victim’s system causing the bandwidth to be congested and making the 
system being inaccessible by legitimate uses. The flood attacks can be UDP flood attacks which 
send numerous UDP requests to a victim’s computer. The UDP requests can be sent to a random 
or specified port. The victim will try to process these requests and render it to the correct 
application. If it does not have an application that supports the request, the victim will 
automatically send out an ICMP packet indicating that the destination port is unreachable.  
Resource depletion attacks on the other hand involve an attacker sending packets that misuse 
network protocol communications or are malformed (Specht & Lee, 2004). Network resources 
are tied up so that none are left for legitimate users.  The most common resource depletion attack 
is the TCP SYN attack that this paper has described earlier. The other resource depletion DDoS 
attack is the misuse of the PUSH+ACK protocol. In a PUSH + ACK attack, the attacking agents 
send TCP packets with the PUSH and ACK bits set to one in the packet header information. 
These will trigger the victim’s system to unload all data in the TCP buffer (regardless of whether 
or not the buffer is full) and send an acknowledgement when complete (Specht & Lee, 2004). If 
this process is repeated with multiple agents, the receiving system cannot process the large 
volume of incoming packets and the victim’s system will crash. 
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  2.3 Existing techniques used to detect suspicious activities in network traffic 
An anomaly detection technique in networks refers to the problem of finding exceptional 
patterns in network traffic that do not conform to the expected normal behaviour. These 
nonconforming patterns are often referred to as anomalies, outliers, exceptions, aberrations, 
surprises (Bhuyan et al., 2014). This anomaly detection in a network environment is a wide 
growing field that has gained momentum of late with the concomitant rise in the adoption of 
machine learning and statistics when developing tools to detect anomalies in the network 
(Bhuyan et al., 2014).  Detection of anomalies is moving from the manual process where the 
security analysts are required to continuously audit network activities and make sound judgments 
when detecting network outliers.  
Network anomaly detection techniques that Bhuyan et al. (2014) broadly discusses in his work 
can be categorized into four classes. They are statistical, classification-based, clustering and 
outlier-based. A statistical method usually bases its aberration detection procedure by looking at 
activities from a given data set that have a low probability of being generated. Applying 
statistical inferences, the technique can then decide if the activity belongs to the statistics model 
or not. If it does not, it is automatically flagged off as a network anomaly.  
Classification on the other hand looks at categorizing network activities into classes and then 
matching each of the incoming and outgoing network activities in the existing classes. The 
classification of the network activity is based on the availability of a training dataset that 
categorizes the membership of activities in network traffic. Clustering is assigning a set of 
objects into groups called clusters. Objects in the same cluster have more similarities in some 
sense compared to objects that are in different clusters. Clustering is used in explorative data 
mining techniques. Outliers are those points in a dataset that are highly unlikely to occur given a 
model of the data. Clustering and outlier finding are examples of unsupervised machine learning 
as Bhuyan et al. (2014) states.  Bhuyan et al. (2014) go further and confirms that clustering can 
be performed in network anomaly detection in an offline environment. 
Another method that have been used to detect suspicious activities is signature-based filtering of 
traffic in Intrusion Prevention Systems. Signature based filtering mechanism in network IPS and 
IDS borrows the concept from the operation of legacy and current antivirus. A signature-based 
detection mechanism can be termed to be a reactive nature of detecting suspicious activities. The 
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nature of operation of a signature-based system is based on looking at the pre-recorded patterns 
and flagging out patterns that match to its records. This method is very sufficient in detecting 
known attacks. However, it becomes challenging when we are faced with new attacks that keep 
changing form and pattern in networked environment.  
   2.4 System developed for detecting suspicious activities in network traffic  
Techniques that have been discussed above have been deployed in most IDS to try and combat 
suspicious activities which can either be anomalies in a network or not. They have provided 
network administrators and security analysts with an easy task of securing their networks and 
having solid explanations to the activities that go on in their networks.  Most of these IDS 
borrow from the techniques discussed in the section above to create a system that can detect 
network attacks (suspicious activities).  
Minnesota Intrusion Detection System (MINDS) employs the use of data mining to detect 
network intrusion (Ertoz et al., 2005). It collects data through flow tools that act as its input, the 
system then looks at the packet header information and build a one-way session to the flows. 
MINDS work hand in hand with NetFlow which is the data collection tool. MINDS use the data 
in batch mode since it is presented with a lot of data to analyze and make decisions. However, 
not all data will be sent to MINDS for analysis. Based on the use specifications, the data of 
interest will be sent to MINDS engine for analysis (Bhuyan et al., 2014).  
The first step that MINDS takes, following the discussion Bhuyan et al. (2014) have is to extract 
the important features that it wants to use based on a summary called time windows. The known 
attack detection module is the next feature to be fired up. It is used to detect network connections 
that correspond to attacks for which signatures are available, and to remove them from further 
analysis. 
 Next, an outlier technique is activated to assign an anomaly score to each network connection. A 
human analyst will then look at only the most out of normal connections to determine if they are 
smoke screens or actual abnormal behaviour in the network.  
Integrating Elastic Search and Kibana (ELK stack) and packet capturing application like 
Wireshark in doing real time network analysis as described by the project by Elastic Blog (2018) 
is also a good way to detect suspicious network activities using an integrated system. Elastic 
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search from Kuc et al. (2015) and Owuor (2016) is an open source search engine library built on 
Apache Lucene. It is written in Java and uses Lucene internally for all of its indexing and 
searching.  On the other hand, it is a log shipper and log manager. It is a tool for managing 
events and logs. Owuor (2016) explains that it is written in JRuby and is easy to deploy since a 
single JAR file can be started directly from the CMD prompt or the terminal. An agent can act as 
a shipper which sends and collects events to another instance, an indexer which receives and 
indexes the events, a searcher storage, which searches, and stores events or a web interface 
depending on the configuration file.  
Kibana is a web interface for Elasticsearch. It is used to give the robust GUI that network 
analysts and security engineers need to visualize the data stored in the Elasticsearch database 
(Gupta, 2015). It displays data in form of area charts, data tables, line charts, markdown widgets, 
metrics, pie charts or tile maps. The tool is used to provide the analysis options of the centralized 
logs. Gupta (2015) further explains that Kibana requires a webserver and it is written in HTML 
and JavaScript language.  
Integrating the ELK stack means that network security experts will be able to write customs rules 
on before it ships the logs or the packets it has captured from Wireshark to Elastic search. 
Looking at the nature of the attacks from DDoS, resource depletion attacks or bandwidth 
depletion attacks, it can be easy from customizing to identify the handlers in such a system and 
shut them down.  
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   2.5 Conceptual Framework   
 
Figure 2-1: System concept diagram 
  The concept diagram captured in figure 2-1 above represents the solution that this research 
sought out to implement. From the discussion in section 2.4 above on the existing systems that 
have been developed to detect suspicious activities in network traffic, one thing stands out. For 
better detection, three system components need to merged.  Rules need to be written and saved 
somewhere, hence later applied to check against input to the system which will be network 
traffic. This rule and input matching procedure will produce some logs. These logs, in most 
systems like Gupta’s (2015) and Owuor’s (2016) utilized the ELK stack to ship the logs. The 
logs were shipped and stored using Logstash and elastic search respectively.  Eventually, the last 
module was a visualization tool which was Kibana as Gupta’s (2015) and Owuor’s (2016) 
explain for the ELK instance.  
Using the same approach, this research, through the deployment of Snort and Barnyard2 engine 
as shown the diagram 2-1 above aimed at preforming rule matching against traffic that was 
coming from the attacker’s network through the router. Rules were provided the Snort engine 
using PulledPork. Once logs have been generated using the rule matching procedure, they were 
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parsed and sorted in the MySQL databased using Barnyard2. As in the case for ELK, using 
Kibana as the visualization tool and Elastic search as the database, this research used BASE as 
the visualization tool to fetch data from the logs stored in the MySQL databased and display 





















   Chapter 3 
   Methodology 
   3.1 Introduction 
The chapter looks at the approach that the research took to ensure the work proposed produced a 
reliable system that can detect suspicious activities in a networked environment. System 
Development Methodology kicked off the scope of this chapter followed by the Research 
Design.  
Data collection methodology that was used in the research and the sample space is discussed in 
this chapter. The chapter then proceeds to look at how data was collected and analyzed to suit the 
needs and answer the questions presented by this study. Finally, the chapter justifies the quality 
of the research and looks at the ethical considerations made when conducting the research. 
3.2 System Development Methodology  
This research was based on test-driven deployment. According to Astels (2003), this is a 
commonly-used development methodology by which (failing) tests are initially created, and only 
then is the actual software code created, which aims to pass the newly-generated tests. The 
researcher chose this approach owing to the nature of the system to be developed. Since the 
research was dealing with different components and integrating them, numerous tests were 
conducted whenever one component was built and configured. Numerous follow up test were 
conducted again after the integration phases was complete. This was to make sure that the initial 
tests being done maintained the status quo and allowed the researcher to move on to the next 
step.  
The researcher developed and wrote a test for Snort tried and tested Snort in the LAN. On 
numerous occasions, the researcher had to edit configuration files for Snort and check if the 
changes had been affected. Afterwards, Snort as a module was kept aside and other supporting 
components like Barnyard2 and PulledPork had to be developed using a test-driven approach as 
highlighted earlier. At the integration phase, modification to the configuration files were made to 
make sure Barnyard2 and PulledPork assisted Snort to sniff, parse and check if the rules fetched 
by PulledPork were conformed to by the traffic in the network. At each stage, a test was 
conducted, if the expected result was not achieved, the researcher had to debug the configuration 
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file or check the module logs to come up with a solution. The same approach was taken when 
transporting the logs to the MySQL database for storage, tests were conducted to make sure 
MySQL DB was correctly set up and was running on the Linux testbed. In addition, an iterative 
process of making sure Snort, PulledPork and Barnyard2 worked together to generate the data 
needed to be pushed to the DB. This integration with the database failed a couple of times. The 
system and error logs generated from this enabled the researcher to successfully debug the 
system and finally deploy. The last phase of integrating the web GUI was dependent on other 
modules. For BASE to run, the researcher had to install it correctly and make sure it is 
compatible with the LAMP stack that already existed. This called for a downgrade of PHP and 
an installation of Perl throughout the test and deployment stages to make sure BASE was up and 
running. For final testing, the researcher had to bring in together Snort, Barnyard2 and 
PulledPork and make sure they communicated to BASE.  
However, as Beck (2003) notes, this methodology allowed the system developer to always come 
back and make changes whenever they experience a failed test in future to enhance the 
completion of a working project. The steps that are involved in the test-driven methodology are 
writing a test, confirming the test fails, writing system to pass test, confirming the test passes, 
refactor and repeating all the steps in the existing components. As described above, the 
researcher found this approach to be effective.  The figure 3-2 illustrates the methodology used 




Figure 3 -2: Test driven methodology diagram (adopted from Anon, 2019) 
3.3 Research Design  
For this research to succeed, both qualitative and quantitative methods were used. A review of   
multiple literature was done to find out the major suspicious activities that exists in network 
traffic. This formed part of the qualitative approach that this research took to achieve its 
objectives.  
However, for completion and materialization of the research, a scientific approach was adopted. 
This backed up the quantitative approach because primary data was collected to aid in the 
analysis of the deployed system and description of the obtained results from the experiment 
conducted. Beyond the deployment and collection of primary data, the research also compared 
the findings it gathered to the existing field of knowledge on network attacks and deployment of 
NIDS. 
This thesis documentation leveraged on experiments carried out from time to time to ensure that 
what is classified as a suspicious activity was flagged out. In this case, ICMP echoes and replies 
were used for demonstration. This expounds on the scientific approach the research took.  This 
called for multiple, repetitive experiments to be conducted. In the same vein, instances of test-
driven deployment were used to develop the system. This is owed to the fact that systems 
parameters kept changing. New information also came up during the system development phase 
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like downloading and updating rules from Barnyard2 and PulledPork that led to numerous 
adjustments being made here and there to ensure the system met the objective of the research.  
3.4 Target population and sampling frame 
The target population for this study was network traffic. The researcher generated the network 
traffic through sending data packets across the networks. The network traffic was analysed by 
using the network security tools, BASE, PulledPork, Snort and Banyard2. These tools were 
chosen based on their availability and compatibility with one another to come with the desired 
setup. Therefore, the sampling technique that the researcher settled for was convenient sampling 
based on the nature of the type of attack launched and tools available. 
3.5 Data collection 
 Primary data was collected to allow the researcher document a report on how well the system 
was able to meet the objectives that were set out in the first chapter. Data from the BASE web 
user interface indicating that ICMP traffic was being flagged out by the system formed the 
primary data that this research collected. This was collected from the experiment setup that the 
researcher proposed and actualized in the next chapter. 
This data was collected mainly through observation of the results that were displayed by the Web 
GUI. This primary data collected, for it to make sense to the research and prove its a liability as 
the expected outcome, the researcher compared it to the existing knowledge in the field of 
information and network security to see if the system was able to enhance knowledge in the area 
and conformed to it.  
3.6 Data analysis and presentation  
Data collection methods influenced the analysis that the researcher engaged in while deploying 
and testing the system. Primary data was collected on the different terminal screens in an 
iterative fashion whenever the researcher was working on the different components of the 
integrated security system for reporting malicious activities. Other data was collected from the 
web browser where BASE was running to collect data and present. Hence, analysis and judgment 
were based on this primary data coupled with secondary data concepts. This research relied 
highly on descriptive analysis to demonstrate how it met the objectives during the system 
development and testing phase.  Images and accompanying explanations and descriptions were 
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used to analyze the data collected by the researcher.  Analysis from the observation was used to 
describe the images.  
   3.7 Research Quality 
The research sought to ensure detection on suspicious activities in a networked environment 
borrows from the best practices used by previous works that have gone into the deployment of 
SNORT and BASE.  
This research was not aimed at reinventing the wheel but at offering major improvement through 
precise feedback on what network administrators across different organization can identify as 
suspicious activities in their networks. Besides that, the research wanted to make this process 
seamless by interfacing an easy to use web GUI to aide in this process. This meant that 
harmonization of old and new knowledge was key. Integration of this, with new ideas was seen 
to be ideal. 
   3.8 Ethical considerations 
The research was deployed in multiple network environments where sample attacks were being 
launched to test the functionality of the system. This research did not target the attacks to any 
other machine other than the ones documented by the researcher that was used for testing 
purposes. Besides that, the researcher did not plug in the integrated security system to scan any 
network subnet that its Snort engine was not operating on. In any case the researcher was to note 
any suspicious activity against their own subnet to a machine that is not among the test 











System Analysis and Design  
   4.1 Introduction  
This chapter elaborates on the steps taken by the researcher during the design phase of the 
system. The chapter starts by looking at the requirement analysis, which encompasses a 
discussion of the functional and non-functional requirements the system set out to meet. The 
chapter analyses the optimal environment for setting up the system for detecting suspicious 
activities in network traffic. This discussion is backed up by the analysis of the security engines 
the researcher used, Snort and Base. Finally, the research outlines the systems operations in a 
series of use case and sequence diagrams.  
   4.2 Requirement Analysis  
The system was designed to meet the set of requirements described below to be A System to 
Detect suspicious Activities in Network Traffic effectively. This requirement analysis is based 
on the findings from the literature review to come up with requirements. The researcher came up 
with requirements which were based on their action, ability, and testability.  
      4.2.1 Functional Requirements  
i. The system should be able to allow users to create custom rules on Snort  
ii. The system should be able to detect suspicious traffic on the network. 
iii. The system should be able to store the logs of the activity in a database that can be 
accessed by third-party applications (BASE) 
iv. The system should allow BASE to interface with Snort to display the network logs on a 
web interface 
      4.2.2 Non-Functional requirements 
The proposed system was designed to allow the creation and customization of rules and to be 
able to implement the rules on incoming traffic at all times. Therefore, the system should be able 
to respond to the incoming packets in a timely manner. The researcher foresees a swift response 
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time in order to make the users in the network where this system is deployed and tested not 
experience any further latency added to packet processing time. 
The system should be scalable. This means, after implementation, the system can be ported with 
very minor modifications to any network environment and operation. The fact that the researcher 
demonstrated the operation of the system on a virtual machine, it is pre-empted that the system 
would still work the same way when plugged in to a real-world scenario.  
4.3 Environment for the System to Detect Suspicious Activities in Network         
Traffic 
In order to come up with this System that Detect Suspicious Activities in Network Traffic, the 
researcher needed a platform that gives great room for customization of the security tools in use. 
The system was implemented in a Linux based environment running Ubuntu 16.04 LTS. The 
choice of the environment was based on the open source nature of the OS and its ability to allow 
Snort and Base and other supporting components to be integrated with other security tools and 
features to enhance the operation.  
   4.4 Snort Analysis and Architecture  
Snort as defined by Dietrich (2015), is an open source network intrusion prevention and 
detection system utilizing a rule driven language, which combines the benefits of signature, 
protocol and anomaly-based inspection methods. The Open Source tool is hailed for its ability to 
be able to detect TCP/IP datagrams on a network in real time. In addition, the flexibility of the 
software makes it very popular among the security researchers. This allows them to connect the 
software to multiple databases such as Oracle, MySQL. In addition, Snort as Gómez et al. (2009) 
explain, can be connected with other components of analysis to make the work of analyzing the 
data easier.  
Operations of Snort can be in two ways; it can be configured to work as a packet sniffer like 
tcpdump and Wireshark tools and as an IDS or IPS. As a packet sniffer, Snort allows the user to 
view the network activities. However, to allow Snort to act as an IDS, there has to be some rule 
creation and rule matching operation.  Snort comes with some packaged rules that require a little 






The Snort operation is based on the integration of the following components in the architecture 
diagram shown below 
 
Figure 4-1: Snort architecture diagram (adopted from Anon, 2019) 
The sniffer, in the figure 4-3, listens for traffic on the network interfaces and captures the 
packets. These packets are meant to be decoded and translated in to C language (Gullett, 2011). 
From there, the pre-processor uses that information to identify the link layer protocols, IP and 
TCP/UDP in the packets. The pre-processor then filters these packets alongside identifying the 
properties to be checked by the detection engine. The rule set acts as an input to the detection 
engine. It populates the detection engine with instructions, which are used to check against the 
patterns on the packet information that has been obtained from the pre-processor. Finally, the 
alerting and logging module is responsible for giving feedback to the users and logging the 
activities of the other components in a database. Some implementation of Snort opts to use log 
files instead of a database.  
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  4.5 Basic Analysis and Security Engine analysis and architecture 
BASE as described by Zhou et al. (2010) does the work of searching through the database that 
contains the logs collected by network monitoring tools. BASE is open to work with an IDS or a 
Firewall. The Web GUI written in PHP is used to display and analyze the information from the 
database in a user-friendly interface. This allows the security researchers or analysts to be able to 
make inferences and decisions a bit faster based on the filtering capabilities that come with the 
implementation of BASE as an analysis tool. Its ability to read network layer packets and 
transport layer packets makes BASE very effective in analysis of network traffic logs. Besides 
this, the portal is able to generate graphs and statistics based on the customization and queries 
passed by the user through the engine. 
In addition, BASE can be configured as an alerting system. A security researcher can be allowed 
to classify alerts and manipulate the response of the system to these alerts. Besides that, after 
major tests, false positives can be detected and deleted. BASE also allows the security 
administrator to allow the system to send alert messages via email. BASE, in most common 
implementations, is set to read both tcpdump and Snort log files easily.  
4.6 Barnyard2 Overview  
According to Erturk, & Kumar (2018) Barnyard2 is an open source interpreter for Snort’s 
unified2 binary output files. It allows Snort to write the logs into the disk in an efficient manner. 
Through this operation, it makes sure that no network traffic is missed because it does the work 
of parsing binary data into multiple formats and leaves Snort to only sniff the network for 
network activities.  It can operate in three modes.  
In batch mode, it only parses the file specified by the system administrators explicitly and then 
turn off. While in continuous mode, it starts looking for specific file patterns in a location and 
then continue to process new data as they appear or as they are exposed to it.  Lastly, in continual 
mode with bookmarking, Barnyard2 uses a waldo file, which in Snort means a checkpoint file. 
The checkpoint file is used to track the progress of the interpretation and in an event where the 
process ends while the waldo file is in use, Barnyard2 resumes processing at the last entry 
available in the waldo file  
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4.7 PulledPork Overview 
This PERL based tool is used alongside Suricata or Snort to perform rule management. It 
downloads and installs the various rules Snort uses depending on the version of Snort running in 
the system. Most configurations allow it to run a cronjob to update the rule automatically.   
   4.8 Diagrammatic Representation of the system  
   4.8.1 System Architecture  
 
 
Figure 3-2: System architecture 
The figure 4-2 outlines the blueprint of the operation and design of the system. From the outlook, 
the researcher has presented the attacker who connects to the network. The attacker in this case 
doubles up as the system administrator and is responsible for running the intergrated security 
system machine. The intergrated security system machine runs Snort and PulledPork plugin. This 
machine communicates to Barnyard2 which connects to the MySQL database. The BASE web 
GUI is hosted  in apache on the system’s machine which has access to the MySQL database to 
fetch data.  
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     4.8.2 Context Diagram  
The data input and output modules for this research are Snort, the NIDs, Barnyard2, BASE and 
the User. The user in this case is the researcher who doubles up as the attacker and the system 
administrator. Snort and Barnyard2 are used to feed data to the Snort DB that the user created. 
Snort sniffs network traffic and logs raw binary data on HDD. Barnyard2 gathers these data and 
send to DB. BASE and the user are used as output modules because the user queries from the DB 
using BASE as the interface and the results are presented. 
 
Figure 4-3 : Context Diagram 
The figure 4-3 shows the user in this case as the researcher who doubles up as the attacker and 
the system administrator. Snort and Barnyard2 are used to feed in data to the Snort DB that the 
user created. Base and the User are used as output modules because the user queries from the DB 
using BASE as the interface and the results are presented to them. 
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   4.8.3 Use case Diagram 
 
 Figure 4-4: Use case Diagram 
The figure 4-4 shows how the different actors interact with the system to make the intergrated 
security system to monitor suspicious network traffic to be implemented. The use case describes 
three actors. The PulledPork plugin is identifed as an actor because it is to be involved in the 
population of rules to the system from the snort online community. Population of rules, is also to 
be done by the User who is to be the researcher in this instance when creating the custom rules.  
The population of rules use case invokes two other processes which are starting the Snort DB 
and initializing Snort to work as a NIDS. The start Snort DB use case is also extended by the 
populate logs to Barnyard2. Barnyard2 is responsible for sending the logs it collects to the snort 
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DB. At the same time, population of log files into Barnyard2 is extended when Snort is started as 
NIDS. Barnyard2 on the other hand extends the sending of logs to Snort DB.  
Sending of logs to snort DB means that the database was configured to work with multiple 3rd 
party applications. This procedure invokes and extends to passing of the logs to BASE. BASE is 
the third party application that the researcher settled for to collect the logs files that have been 
stored in Binary format in the snort DB.   
Finally, the user from the usecase diagram is to be responsible to query the BASE engine for 
results on the web interface. The Base engine responds to the users queries by presenting them 
with a web page containing their logs captured by Snort in the Snort DB.  
    4.8.4  System sequence Diagram  
 
Figure 4-5: System sequence diagram 
The sequence diagram in figure 4-5 illustrates the flow of events when implementing and testing 
the integrated security system to monitor suspicious activities on a network. The first event is the 
initiation of PulledPork by the user to ensure that rules from Snort’s website are fetched and 
populated on snort’s configuration files.  
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The next activity is the user writing custom rules in Snort’s configuration folders. After this, the 
user invokes Barnyard2 to listen on what Snort is capturing. After this, the user initiates Snort to 
start and work as a NIDS, at this point Snort and Barnyard2 interface. The initiation of snort also 
starts a sub process in the background that is the Snort DB that is be used to collect data sent to it 
by Barnyard2.  
Snort scans the network and send the logs to Barnyard2. Barnyard2 parses and changes the logs 
into binary format and sends them to Snort DB for storage. Since this work allows BASE to 
access the snort DB, the logs from Snort DB are made accessible to BASE. The user then 
initiates a query to BASE asking it to display the web page. BASE interprets the user’s request 




  Implementation and Testing 
   5.1 Introduction  
This chapter builds up on the design and analysis from the previous chapter. The outline of the 
chapter is as follows; the models that were brought together to build the system are discussed. 
Both hardware and software components are discussed. The chapter then describes the setup of 
the experiment. It outlines all the steps that were involved to setup the environment. The chapter 
goes through a walkthrough of the implementation phase. Finally, the system is tested and the 
test results are presented and analyzed.  
  5.2 Hardware, Software and Model Components  
The software and hardware components that were used for the experiment to be realized in this 
research were informed by the nature of the tests to be conducted to achieve the objectives set 
out by the research.  
1. Hardware components, A Personal Computer  
i. 8 Gigabyte (GB) Random Access Memory (RAM) 
ii. 500GB hard drive disk storage  
iii. Intel core i5-7200u OS at 2.7 GHz of processing speed  
2. Software Components  
i. Windows 10 Host Operating System  
ii. Virtual Box Hypervisor  
iii. Ubuntu Server 16.04 image (Guest OS)- Running Snort and BASE 
iv. Windows 10 operating system - Attacker’s machine  
v. Putty terminal emulator, serial console and network file transfer application.  











Barnyard2 MySQL DB Apache Web 
Server  
BASE Front 
End   
Figure 5-1: Model diagram 
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  5.3 Experiment Setup 
The experiment to develop the System to Detect Suspicious Activities in Network Traffic was 
done on an Ubuntu 16.04 machine that was customized to meet the needs and objectives of the 
research. Snort, which was the main software component to sniff packets in the network was 
installed alongside other supporting components. It was very important for the researcher to  
make sure Snort is downloaded and configured as a NIDS. Other components that the researcher 
opted to install to support Snort included Barnyard2 module, PulledPork and BASE.  
     5.3.1 The Steps followed to set up the experiment 
To get started virtual box and its extension pack were downloaded and installed on Windows to 
create a virtual machine. The next step was to install and customize Ubuntu 16.04 LTS operating 
system. Large Receiving Offload and Generic Receiving Offload that do packet reassembly were 
disabled to enable snort to truncate packets that were larger than 1518 bytes.  Setting up snort on 
Ubuntu 16.04 LTS consisted of downloading the file, installing and configuring it to run as 
NIDs. Snort was configured to run as NIDs by editing some configuration files. Testing of snort 
was done by using another terminal (Test mode). This was important so as to maintain the status 
quo and be able to move to the next step of integrating Barnyard2. Barnyard2 and its 
dependencies were downloaded and installed.  Barnyard2 was then configured for use with 
MYSQL and as a result Snort DB was created. The researcher went ahead and tested Snort by 
running it in alert mode using the config file. This process ensured Barnyard2 and snort were 
integrated successfully. PulledPork and its dependencies were then set up.  Testing of PulledPork 
was important so as to confirm the configuration changes had been affected.  Cron was then 
downloaded and installed for purposes of scheduling PullePork. BASE provides a web front end 
to query and analyse the alerts coming from the NIDs system. Hence the need to download and 
install it together with its dependencies. Testing was done by launching a local browser to 
confirm whether it was working. Http://localhost/base. Then went ahead and configured BASE. 







  5.4 System Implementation  
    5.4.1 Setting up the network interfaces and installing Snort  
The Large Receiving Offload (LRO) and the Generic Receive Offload (GRO) that do the packet 
reassembly as captured by the network interface Snort is running on can affect the network 
interfaces running Snort. Therefore, they need to be disabled during setup to enable Snort to 
truncate packets that are larger than 1518 bytes.  
This was done by editing the network interfaces file in the Ubuntu 16.04 files and adding the 
following two lines “.  post-up ethtool -K enp0s3 gro off, post-up ethtool -K enp0s3 lro off.  ”in 
the specific interface file under the /etc/network/ directory. The results were confirmed as shown 
in Appendix A.  
The Snort installtion was to take place in a new directory in the desktop of the ubuntu system. 
The tarball file was downloaded from Snort’s website, extracted and compiled. The libraries 
were later updated. More information of the commands that were run throughout the installation 
process are captured in the Appendix H. However, the resulting screen to demonstrate the correct 
installation of Snort is in Appendix B.  
     5.4.2 Configuring Snort to work as an IDS 
Installation of Snort was not enough to allow it to monitor and scan the network activities.  Steps 
that the resercher took to achieve this included copying and setting up the configuration files of 
Snort folder from the desktop where the tarball was downloaded to the /etc directiory in the 
Ubuntu system. Besides that, the researcher also set up the log collection point of Snort to the 
/var/log folder for easier management.  
In addition, the researcher had to configure the main configuration file that runs Snort and add 
the network that Snort should sniff and collect data from. Since this implemention was being 
done in different environments, work, home and campus with different internet subnets, the IP 
address subnet indicated varied depending on the location of the researcher. The configuration 




Figure 5-2: Snort.conf configuration details 
 A series of the commands that the reseacher executed to achieve this is attached on the appendix 
I.  
     5.4.3 Barnyard2 Installation and setup 
The installation of Barnyard2 required installation of dependencies which included downloading 
and setting up a MySQL DBMS that was used to store the log files that were captured by Snort 
from the analysis of the network traffic. The DBMS had a database the researcher called Snort. 
The researcher then had to download Barnyard2 from the source and make changes to point it to 
the Snort Database and allow it to store files there. This was achieved by configuration of the 
main config file that Barnyard2 runs on and adding the output database configuration line at the 
end. The images below show the configuration of MySQL database, linking the database with 
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Barnyard2 and correct initialization of Barnyard2. Successful installation of Barnyard2 and 
linking with MySQL is shown in Appendices C to E 
      5.4.4 PulledPork Installation and Setup 
To set up PulledPork , the dependencies and the main packages had to be downloaded. The 
tarball file that PulledPork comes with contains config files that needed to be copied to the /etc 
folder. The pulledpork.conf file, which is the main config file had to be edited to allow the 
application to pull the rules to the correct destination in the Snort folders. A summary of the lines 
to be changed is shown below.  
 
Figure 5-3: PulledPork.conf configuration summary 
     5.4.5 Installation of BASE and Set Up  
To install BASE, the reseacher had to lay the foundation. Apache2 web server had to be installed 
and configured correctly to run PHP plus other dependencies. Adodb, which is a database 
abstraction layer for PHP had to be installed in the system. This application allows a wide range 
of codes to be used to access a database in the background.  The next procedure was to download 
BASE and copy the files in Apache root folder /var/www/html to allow it to be accessed from 
the browser.  The main configuration file that runs BASE had to be edited to allow it to connect 
to Adodb and the Snort database the application was running in MySQL. A summary of the lines 




Figure 5-4: base_conf.php configuration summary 
After the correct setup of BASE. The, web console needed to be accessed to confirm the 
operation of the BASE module. The path was as follows :192.168.100.14/base 
 
Figure 5-5: Successful BASE setup and configuration 
   5.5 System Testing  
The experiments that were conducted by the research in order to come up with A System security 
tool that allows security administrators to run network scans was done by the invocation of two 
custom rules that were written on Snort. The rules that were written were supposed to capture 
erroneous ICMP requests being sent in the network specified in Snorts range and sending that 
data through the spooler, Barnyard2 to the MySQL database and finally allowing BASE to pull 
the results on a web interface.   
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   5.5.1 Custom rules definition 
The researcher needed to write down custom rules to the system to allow the system to be able to 
detect the ICMP packets sent to it from the network and send those logs via the spooler 
(Barnyard2) for storage. The illustration of the two rules written is captured by the image shown 
below.  
 
Figure 5-6: Local rules added to Snort configurations 
The variable $HOME_NET was prefered by the researcher because of the changing nature of the 
network addresses whenever the researcher was moving in different networks when configuring 
the system.  
      5.5.2 A sample ICMP larger than 64 bytes requests  
To test the operation of the system, the researcher posed as the attacker on their host machine 
and launched an ICMP DoS kind of attack by sending 100 large ICMP packets to the network 




Figure 5-7: Sample DoS attack launched with ICMP 
     5.5.3 Snort Console results to demonstrate Banyard2 and Snort Sniffing Capabilities  
The image below demonstrates how Snort was able to capture the rouge ICMP requests sent to it 
by the user at IP address 192.168.100.9. The captured packets were then passed and sent to the 
MySQL database by Barnyard2 for storage and collection by BASE 
 
Figure 5-8: Snort detecting ICMP request sent to it 
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     5.5.4 BASE portal to showcase the results from Snort  
The ICMP requests that were sent to the network, captured by Snort and stored in the database, 
were able to be captured by BASE and displayed on the web GUI as expected. The images 
captured below show the results from BASE Web GUI for the ICMP attacks launched to the 
network. Detailed screens that depict the results from Snort are captured in Appendices F and G 
 
Figure 5-9: BASE homepage with summarized dashboard 
   5.5.5 System Testing Classes  
Table 1. System testing classes 
Test Class Inspection Check Priority 
Functional Were there any custom rules created? In 
addition, did the rules take effect in the Snort 
system to allow it detect traffic based on the 
customized rules? 
High 
Functional Was the system able to detect suspicious 




Functional  Was the system able to store the logs of the 
activity in a database MySQL that can be 
accessed by third-party applications (BASE) 
after referencing to it? 
 
Medium  
Functional  Did the system allow BASE to interface with 




Non- functional Was the system responsive enough to respond 
to the incoming packets in a timely manner 
and present results to the system administrator 
in a real time fashion? 
Medium 
 
   5.5.6 System testing results 
Table 2. System testing results 
Test Class Test Results Comment 
Functional Pass Suspicious ICMP traffic was able to be detected in the 
network by the integrated security system and the results 
presented in an easy to use GUI powered by BASE 
Non-Functional Pass There was acceptable responsiveness from the system 
during the implementation as it was able to capture real 
time events in the network traffic. 
 
  5.6 Challenges faced  
The implementation and testing of the system presented the researcher with a number of 
challenges. The complexity of customizing the Ubuntu 16.04 and making sure the components 
that allowed the implementation of a system security system was faced. Allowing the modules, 
Snort, PulledPork, Barnyard2 and BASE to work in harmony required a lot of tenacity and 
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research to understand their different functionality. Besides that, another complexity that the 
researcher was faced with was the configuration of the dependency packages. The PHP module 
selected by the researcher at first was not compatible with BASE and PERL. The researcher had 
to look for a solution, which was to downgrade to a lower version.  
The other challenge that the research posed during the implementation was constantly changing 
the Snort configuration file to capture the new network configuration that was presented by the 
new network the researchers’ machine visited. This meant that the researcher was always aware 
of the changes and any negligence whenever they moved to a new network would make the 




















Conclusions and Future Work 
  6.1 Overview  
This chapter dissects the finding presented in the chapter above. It discusses the experiment 
results and sheds light between the topic of the research and the findings presented above. In 
addition, the chapter looks at the future research work that could be done in the same area by 
concluding and making recommendations drawn from the research findings.  
  6.2 Discussion  
Data collected in the previous chapter brings into perspective why integration in security 
operations (threat detection, alert system, analysis and response) is very important. From the test 
results, the researcher was able to pose as the attacker in the network and launch an ICMP attack 
similar to a DoS attack. The system was able to catch this suspicious activity in the network and 
respond to it appropriately. This was due to the functionality of Snort and PulledPork, the 
network sniffer that was configured to work as a NIDS.  
Snort was able to work alone at first by displaying the log files on the terminal. However, top 
push the agenda for integration, the researcher was able to come up with additional components 
and plug them in on the system. Barnyard2 was able to pick these snort logs, translate them into 
binary and push them to the database for storage.  
BASE on the other hand came in to provide a good GUI on web platform to allow the researcher 
to display the alerts in a more organized approach. The different images that show the BASE 
GUI captured by the researcher in the previous chapter focus on the ICMP attack that was carried 
out in the network. The screen demonstrates the power of BASE in analysis of those log as it 
gives more information or very specific and useful information that can be used for decision 
making as far as security is concerned. For instance, the IP addresses, both source and 
destination are displayed for all the alerts generated by Snort. This is coupled with the layer 4 




  6.3 Conclusion  
The system was developed primarily to look at the network activities that occurred within the 
researcher’s subnet. Combining the different components that have been discussed in chapter 
four of the research, gave the work an upper hand in the integration of a security system that 
would achieve the objectives set out in chapter 1.  
Chapter 2 of this research presented the different tools that have been used to implement 
integrated security systems either for the network or the hosts, which are popularly known as 
HIDS. The approach that was used to make sure the components the researcher settled for in this 
work was based on this previous implementation like Elastic Search, Logstash and Kibana 
implementations. These were the findings that informed the researcher to settle on the research 
approach that they took in chapter 3 and perform similar software modelling techniques that 
were employed by the previous works in the field of integrating software components to either 
NID or HID.  
  6.4 Recommendations 
This research recommends that for a similar setup, security engineers should implement their 
systems on a Linux based environment. This is because of the hardened nature of Linux based 
operating system. This means that the researchers were not be worried about the security of their 
own testbed but the network.  
Lastly, the paper recommends that the Snort rules that come pre-packaged by the application is a 
very good starting point for out of the box implementation. However, it is advised that the 
security administrators go out of their way to come up with new rules that locally apply to their 
integration and are custom - made to them. This makes it easier for them to know what each alert 
means and the reason the alert was triggered. Besides that, it is also important for the security 
administrators to familiarize themselves with existing snort rules and know what they mean 
before invoking them.  
  6.5 Future Research Work  
This work focused on installing the system on a network that is running on one subnet. In future, 
the researcher recommends allowing the system to scan more than one network. In addition, the 
researcher recommends that for future implementations, important network nodes like DNS, 
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DHCP, Email and Active Directories should be listed down in the snort.conf file and allow 
PulledPork to specify specific rules from the open source community to be applied specifically to 
these important services as the first priority. This means, each of the services will have its own 
specific rules attached to it and enforced to run on the highest priority.  
In addition, this research notes that Snort was configured to run on one instance with base. The 
research recommends that future works that go into this field should look at how there can be 
multiple instances of snort in different LANs, owned by the same organization communicating 
(sending and parsing logs) to one database that BASE will access. The research foresees that this 
implementation will push integration and the benefits that comes with this centralization a notch 
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Appendix A: LRO and GRO disabled feedback 
 
Appendix B: Successful snort installation 
 




Appendix D: Successful Barnyard2 integration with MySQL 
 




Appendix F: ICMP summary detailed screen 
 





























































Appendix L: BASE installation and Setup 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
